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Abstract 
The life cycle/permanent income hypothesis (LCPIH) makes two postulates: people 
behave with rational expectations, and people do not have self-control problems. If 
either or both of these postulates do not apply, we cannot obtain a testable implication of 
the LCPIH. We use Japanese panel data that include responses to self-reported and 
retrospective questions to elicit individual characteristics such as forward-looking 
behavior, experience of self-control problems, and use of commitment devices to 
overcome self-control problems. First, we test the rational expectations hypothesis and 
find that it holds for the whole sample. We then test the LCPIH implication and find that 
consumption does not change in response to expected income changes, which we 
restrict to fit the assumptions of the LCPIH. This result indicates that the LCPIH is a 
convincing model to account for the behavior of rational consumers who have rational 
expectations and no self-control problems. Our results also imply that responses to 
self-reported and retrospective questions are not meaningless when eliciting information 
on household characteristics. 
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1. Introduction 
Understanding the mechanisms of consumer behavior is fundamental for evaluating the 
macroeconomic impact of public policy. The life cycle/permanent income hypothesis 
(LCPIH) is a basic model for describing consumption behavior over time. Therefore, 
many economists have conducted empirical analyses to test the LCPIH. Some 
researchers have examined the relation between predicted income change and 
consumption growth, and found that, if the LCPIH holds, the predicted income change 
does not help explain consumption growth.1
In rejecting the LCPIH implication, several hypotheses have been tested, 
including liquidity constraints, precautionary motives, inseparability of consumption 
and leisure, buffer-stock saving behavior, durability of goods, and habit formation. A 
fundamental specification error of an economic model is also candidate to induce the 
excess sensitivity. 
 Despite many empirical studies testing the 
LCPIH using this method, no consensus on the LCPIH has been reached (Browning and 
Lusardi, 1996; Attanasio, 1999; Attanasio and Weber, 2010; Jappelli and Pistaferri, 
2010). 
Our paper focuses on the implicit and defined assumptions of the standard 
LCPIH.2
The rational expectations hypothesis (REH) is implicitly and definitely 
assumed for any models of dynamic decision making. Some empirical studies have 
tested REH. For example, Das and van Soest (1999) and Souleles (2004) provided 
evidence that shows that agents cannot forecast their future income changes correctly. 
Standard models also assume that people do not have self-control problems. In other 
 The standard LCPIH assumes that households can construct consumption 
plans based on unbiased predictions of future income and that they can execute their 
plans. In other words, we focus on two postulates of the LCPIH: (1) households have 
rational expectations; (2) households do not have self-control problems. If either or both 
of these assumptions are not applicable, we cannot obtain a testable implication of the 
LCPIH. Moreover, if these assumptions do not describe actual behavior, the economic 
model will not explain actual behavior. To construct a more suitable model, we must 
know what assumptions are reasonable. 
                                                 
1 This test, known as the excess sensitivity test, was originally proposed by Flavin (1981). She 
modified Hall’s model assuming that income follows an ARMA process and found excess sensitivity, 
which means that the response of consumption change to income change is greater than the LCPIH 
implies. 
2 In this paper, we refer to the standard consumption model as the model proposed by Hall (1978). 
Hall assumed that the utility function is additively separable for time and quadratic (which makes the 
instantaneous utility function concave), that the interest rate is equivalent to the subjective discount 
rate, and that there is a perfect capital market. In addition, Hall introduces uncertainty of future 
income. 
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words, under the LCPIH consumers can execute ex ante optimal consumption plans. 
However, many empirical studies have shown that a certain proportion of people do 
experience self-control problems.3
The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the LCPIH, and two 
associated postulates, hold for the households in our sample. If the LCPIH holds, 
expected income changes should not explain consumption changes for households that 
not only precisely predict their future income changes but also execute ex ante optimal 
consumption plans. To examine this prediction, we use data from the Preference and 
Life Satisfaction Survey (PLiSS) conducted as part of a 21st Century Center of Excellent 
(COE) Program and Global COE Program by Osaka University.
 If the assumption of no self-control problems is not 
valid, the implication of the LCPIH could be rejected.  
4
The excess sensitivity test requires an expectation of income change. We use 
subjective expectations of income change, which is a better approach than the 
instrumental variable method because it contains richer information that an 
econometrician cannot observe (Browning and Lusardi, 1996; Jappelli and Pistaferri, 
2000). This approach also helps in examining the REH because we can compare actual 
incomes with subjective income expectations. Furthermore, the responses to our 
questions on expected income changes are presented as quantitative measures rather 
than as qualitative ones and have greater variation than in previous studies such as Das 
and van Soest (1999), Jappelli and Pistaferri (2000), and Souleles (2004). Thus, our data 
 The PLiSS is a 
longitudinal survey conducted from 2004 to 2010 that asks questions about individual 
preferences and individual future expectations about income and consumption. 
Responses to self-reported and retrospective questions enable us to identify respondents’ 
forward-looking behavior, which is an element of the REH, and characteristics related 
to self-control problems. Using these questions, we can identify households whose 
characteristics coincide with the assumptions of the LCPIH. Of course, some concerns 
might arise about the usefulness of self-reported or retrospective questions in eliciting 
household characteristics. One criticism of the method is the difference between actual 
behavior and behavior described in responses. In particular, this criticism is likely to 
apply to information on individual self-control problems. Although we cannot fully deal 
with this issue, we try to provide a robust result by using several kinds of questions. 
                                                 
3 Papers examining self-control problems include Frederick, Lowenstein, and O’Donoghue (2002) 
and Della Vigna (2009). 
4 The full name is the 21st Century Center of Excellence Program titled “Construction of Behavioral 
Macrodynamics by Large-scale Survey and Experiments.” This program was supported by the 
Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports and Science and Technology since 2003. 
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enable us to implement the REH test and the excess sensitivity test under more 
favorable conditions than previous studies.5
In the first step of our analysis, to examine the REH and detect households for 
which the REH holds, we conduct the REH test (unbiased prediction test) for both the 
whole sample and the subsamples, created by dividing the whole sample according to 
proxies for forward-looking behavior. We find that, in the whole sample, people can 
correctly forecast their future income changes. Furthermore, our results of the REH test 
for the subsamples show that people who always make plans before they actually 
implement them predict their future incomes more precisely than people who do not 
make such plans. This result indicates that our proxies for forward-looking behavior 
successfully detect individual characteristics that relate to rational expectations. 
 
In the second step, we examine whether the LCPIH holds for households 
whose behavior coincides with the LCPIH assumptions. First, we find that the predicted 
growth in income explains the growth in consumption for the whole sample, even when 
controlling for the precautionary saving motive, nonseparability between consumption 
and leisure, forecast error potentially arising from short panel data, and the effect of 
liquidity constraints. As expected, our results show stronger excess sensitivity for 
non-forward-looking households, but weaker excess sensitivity for forward-looking 
households that make plans. In addition, using survey questions, we identify not only 
the households for which the REH holds but also those that do not have self-control 
problems. In this group, we do not observe excess sensitivity. Incrementally, we 
implement the excess sensitivity test after dividing the sample into sophisticated 
households and naïve households to investigate the theoretical implications of 
O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999).6
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we survey relevant 
literature related to our hypothesis. Section 3 explains the survey and sample data used 
in our study. Section 4 provides the empirical model used to examine the REH. Section 
5 explains the empirical model used to examine the LCPIH. In Section 6, we report the 
 We find that sophisticated households have weaker 
excess sensitivity than naïve households. This result supports our hypothesis. If we 
confine our sample to the group for which the standard LCPIH is intended, we confirm 
that the LCPIH is not rejected. This result implies that the LCPIH is useful for 
predicting consumer behavior for rational households and comprehensive as the 
benchmark model. Furthermore, our results indicate that responses to self-reported and 
retrospective questions are not meaningless in eliciting information on households’ 
characteristics. 
                                                 
5 Souleles (2004) also implemented the REH test and the excess sensitivity test. However, he used 
matched data to conduct the excess sensitivity test. 
6 Whereas sophisticated households are aware of their self-control problems, naïve households are 
not. We divide our sample based on responses to self-reported and retrospective questions. 
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empirical results of the REH test and the excess sensitivity test. Section 7 concludes the 
paper. 
 
2. Related literature 
We focus on two postulates of the LCPIH: (1) households have rational expectations; 
(2) households do not have self-control problems. In this section, we survey the 
literature relevant to these postulates. 
 
2.1. Rational expectations hypothesis 
The REH is postulated not only for the LCPIH but also for any macroeconomic models 
that analyze agent’s dynamic decision making. The REH in relation to future income 
changes is often defined as follows: where  is the expected 
income growth rate from t to t+1 expected at t, E is the expectation operator,  is 
the income growth rate from t to t+1, and  is the agent’s information set available at 
t. This equation indicates that agents are forward looking and, on average, correctly 
forecast their future income changes. 
As the REH is the central assumption in any dynamic model, many studies 
have investigated households’ predictions of factors such as the future inflation rate, the 
interest rate, and change in income (Pesaran and Weale, 2006). However, there is no 
established consensus on the REH. Although many studies have investigated the REH 
using aggregate-level data, only a few papers have examined the REH using 
household-level data because of data limitations. As Manski (2004) mentioned, 
micro-level data on future expectations are required in order to elicit a household’s 
dynamic decision-making mechanism. 
Empirical studies of the REH that use household-level data compare the 
predicted and actual outcomes. We refer to this method as the unbiased prediction test. 
As Chamberlin (1984) and Souleles (2004) pointed out, the unbiased prediction test 
raises some concerns in testing the REH. They emphasized that the forecast error could 
reject any empirical model testing households’ dynamic decisions. Two types of forecast 
error have been identified (Souleles, 2004). The first type arises from data limitations. 
According to the LCPIH that assumes the REH, the error term of the Euler equation 
must be zero. The conditional expectation of the forecast error will be zero when taking 
an average over long periods of time. However, the forecast error will not be zero across 
a large number of households. Furthermore, if the forecast error is the sum of an 
aggregate shock and of an idiosyncratic shock, then the orthogonal condition fails in a 
short panel even if the LCPIH is true. Aggregate shocks could induce a cross-sectional 
correlation between expected consumption growth and predicted income growth. Some 
empirical evidence using household-level data indicates that this forecast error is 
significant. For example, Das and van Soest (1999) used data from The Dutch 
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Socio-Economic Panel and rejected the REH; their results showed that households tend 
to underestimate future income changes. 
Systematic heterogeneous forecast errors are the second type of error, and can 
lead to rejection of the REH even if we can use sufficiently long panel data to test it. In 
this respect, Souleles (2004) is a crucial study because he tested the REH using longer 
data from The Michigan Survey of Consumer Attitudes and Behavior, which contains 
information on households’ expectations about their future income prospects, business 
conditions, and prices, among others. His test rejected the REH because of evidence 
showing that the forecast errors were correlated with household demographic 
characteristics. This result implies that systematic heterogeneity in forecast errors could 
be a general problem when testing the LCPIH. If the agent’s characteristics that could 
potentially induce systematic forecast errors are correlated with predictions of own 
future income changes and consumption behavior, excess sensitivity could be 
observed.7
Another possible explanation for the failure of the REH is bounded rationality, 
which has been used broadly since Simon (1955).
 
8
 
 Furthermore, the rule of thumb 
could also cause a rejection of the REH. For example, Campbell and Mankiw (1989; 
1990; 1991) assumed rule-of-thumb behavior as current consumption changes depend 
on current income changes, and showed that 35%–50% of consumers can be classified 
as rule-of-thumb consumers. 
 
2.2. Self-control problems 
The standard consumption model assumes that people do not have self-control problems, 
which means that they can execute their ex ante optimal consumption plans. However, 
in the real world, people may struggle with self-control problems in any situation. 
Therefore, there are many theoretical approaches to modeling self-control problems, as 
well as considerable empirical evidence showing that people experience self-control 
problems (Frederick, Lowenstein, and O’Donoghue, 2002; Della Vigna, 2009). In 
addition, agents’ awareness of their self-control problems is an important topic because 
it relates to aspects of public policy, such as the pension system or bankruptcy rules. It is 
therefore worthwhile to test whether the assumption of self-control problems is critical 
in describing consumption behavior. 
                                                 
7 Overconfidence and propensity to plan might be candidates to cause systematic forecast errors; for 
example, see Clark and Friesen (2009) and Ameriks, Caplin, and Leahy (2003). 
8 Conlisk (1996) conducted a survey of studies of bounded rationality. The rule of thumb has been 
used in a similar way. In the words of Rodepeter and Winter (2000, p. 1), “rule of thumb behavior is 
as important aspect of bounded rationality”. 
 6 
There are five broad approaches to modeling self-control problems. One 
approach assumes that people have present-biased quasi-hyperbolic discounting 
preferences (Strotz, 1995; Ainslie, 1992; Laibson, 1997; O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999). 
That is, people put more weight on the present than on the future, leading to dynamic 
inconsistency.9
We do not seek to prove these theoretical explanations for self-control 
problems, as our purpose is to test the validity of the LCPIH assumption for households 
with rational expectations and no self-control problems—characteristics that coincide 
with the standard LCPIH assumptions. 
 As this model is simple and tractable, many studies have modified it 
and provide empirical evidence based on it. The second approach is the temptation 
model, as used in Gul and Pessendorfer (2001); they show that commitment is a useful 
mechanism to overcome temptation by restricting the agent’s choice sets. The third 
approach is the dual-self model (Thaler and Shefrin, 1981; Fudenberg and Levine, 
2006), which analyzes the relationship between two types of self-behavior: an optimal 
planner and a myopic doer. The fourth approach to modeling self-control problems 
considers self-signaling, which assumes two periods and imperfect knowledge of one’s 
own type (Béhabou and Tirole, 2004). The fifth approach examines the agent’s will or 
willpower, as in Ozdenoren, Salant, and Silverman (forthcoming); they incorporate 
willpower into a basic household’s dynamic decision-making model as a depletable but 
renewable resource. 
Whether or not people are aware of their self-control problems is also an 
important issue. If they are aware of their self-control problems, they should use 
commitment devices to work out optimal consumption plans. O’Donoghue and Rabin 
(1999; 2001) classified households as sophisticated or naïve and discussed the welfare 
implications in a quasi-hyperbolic discount model.10
                                                 
9 Let ut denote the instantaneous utility at time t, Ut the overall utility at time t, and δ the discount 
factor. We can write the overall utility as follows: Ut = ut + βδut + 1 + β(δ × δ)ut + 2 + ⋯. In 
contrast to the standard model (β = 1), parameter β < 1 induces time-inconsistent preferences, which 
implies that households have self-control problems. 
 They showed that sophisticated 
households employ commitment devices to force them to execute their ex ante plans. 
10 O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001) classified households as (1) sophisticated, (2) partially naïve, or 
(3) fully naïve. They introduced a person’s beliefs about his or her self-control problems . In the 
case of , which means that a self-control problem exists, and where the agent’s belief is 
, which means the agent is fully aware of his or her self-control problem, the person is called 
“sophisticated.” In the case of  and where the agent’s belief is , which means the 
agent is not at all aware of his or her self-control problem, the person is “fully naïve.” They also 
introduce a “partially naïve” person, for  and , which means the person does not 
precisely know of his or her self-control problem. 
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Naïve households, by contrast, do not use commitment devices and their ex post 
lifetime utility is worse off than the lifetime utility evaluated by the ex ante plan. Some 
empirical studies have analyzed the effect of commitment devices on decisions of 
participation and savings, focusing on individual retirement accounts, 401(k) retirement 
savings plans, and social security in the case of the United States (Madrian and Shea, 
2001; Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick 2003; Thaler and Benartzi, 2004). However, 
sufficient evidence has not been provided to explore the relationship between 
consumption behavior and the use of commitment devices. 
According to the LCPIH, consumption behavior should not change in response 
to expected income changes if households do not have self-control problems. However, 
consumption behavior could respond to expected income change if households do have 
self-control problems.11
 
 Furthermore, the model proposed by O’Donoghue and Rabin 
(1999; 2001) predicts that the LCPIH assumption could be rejected for naïve households 
that do not prepare a commitment device in advance. Our paper examines this 
hypothesis using self-reported and retrospective questions that proxy for sophisticated 
households. 
3. Data 
3.1. Preference and Life Satisfaction Survey 
This paper uses micro-level data from the Preference and Life Satisfaction Survey 
(PLiSS), a panel survey conducted by Osaka University as part of the 21st Century COE 
Program and Global COE Program. 12
The annual attrition rate for the panel ranges from 12% to 29% and the sample 
size decreases over time. Therefore, the sample for our analysis is an unbalanced panel. 
To test the REH and excess sensitivity, we keep observations that contain sufficient 
information to obtain the changes in family income and consumption for at least two 
successive periods. The sample includes married respondents where either the husband 
 This survey gathers useful information on 
individual preferences and predictions for future income and consumption changes. 
With this information on future expectations and longitudinal data, we can jointly test 
the rational expectations and excess sensitivity of the same households. The sample 
households are selected randomly from across Japan using the Basic Residents 
Registration System, thus providing a representative sample of the total Japanese 
population. Households were interviewed once a year from February 2004 to 2010. New 
households entered the panel in 2006 and 2009. 
                                                 
11 If households have time-inconsistent preferences for immediate costs, they procrastinate in order 
to decrease their consumption when their future income is expected to decrease (O’Donoghue and 
Rabin, 1999). 
12 The 21st Century COE Program and the Global COE Program are projects conducted by the 
Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports and Science and Technology. 
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or the wife is employed. Retired households are excluded from the sample. After 
eliminating observations with missing data, the resulting sample includes 7,128 
respondents. The total number of observations is 19,052 and the percentages of 
cross-sectional observations in each year of the survey are 16%(2004-05), 
12%(2005-06), 16%(2006-07), 14%(2007-08), 13%(2008-09), and 28%(2009-10). 13
 
 
The sample used in our analysis follows the same trend for the proportion of 
cross-sectional observations as the total sample that includes observations excluded 
because of missing values. 
[Table 1] 
 
Table 1 shows the basic characteristics of the households in our data set. The 
average age of the respondents is 52.68 years. Half of all respondents are female. Half 
of all respondents are high school graduates and a quarter of all respondents are 
university or college graduates. 
 
3.2. Main variables 
3.2.1. Income 
The PLiSS collects data on income in several ways. We use two income variables: (1) 
total annual household income and (2) the sum of the monthly incomes of the 
respondent and spouse over the course of the year.14
                                                 
13 Table A in Appendix 1 provides a brief distribution of observations by year. 
 Although we need the rate of 
income change to test rational expectations, we cannot obtain the precise rate of income 
change using total annual household income because it is a categorical variable. To 
mitigate measurement errors arising from basing calculations on a categorical variable, 
we also use the monthly income data, which are obtained by asking an open-ended 
question. However, using the monthly income data has two limitations. First, the 
monthly income variable is not total household income. Because the variable for the 
expected income growth rate (EGY) asks about total household income, the monthly 
income variable is not consistent with EGY. Second, panel data for monthly income are 
available over a shorter period of time than those for the household’s total annual 
income, because the monthly income question was added in 2007. Therefore, to obtain 
robust results for the rational expectations test, we use two income change rate 
variables: GY(1), which is calculated using total annual household income, and GY(2), 
which is calculated as the sum of the respondent’s and spouse’s monthly incomes over 
the course of the year. Both variables, GY(1) and GY(2), show that around half of the 
14 The wording of the questions is given in Appendix 2. 
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observations of annual family income are nearly zero.15
 
 The distribution of GY(1) has 
more kurtosis than that of GY(2). 
3.2.2. Consumption 
The PLiSS also collects data on several measures of consumption. For example, the 
survey tracks household expenses for eating at home, household expenses for eating out, 
household expenses for durable goods, and primary household expenses excluding 
durable goods. We use the primary household expenses excluding durable goods as the 
measure of household expenditure. This question is worded as follows: 
 
How much was your entire family’s average monthly expenditure in 2009? 
Exclude durable consumer goods purchased such as houses, cars, expensive 
electronic products. Also exclude taxes, insurance premiums, and mortgage 
interest. Include costs of public utilities and energy bills. 
 
These consumption data offer three advantages. First, excluding expenses for 
durable goods eliminates the problem of consumption durability. Second, as this survey 
asks for average expenditure, we do not need to account for seasonal fluctuations in 
expenditure. Third, these data include expenditure for goods and services, as well as 
food-related expenses. By contrast, the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, a well-known 
longitudinal panel survey in the United States, only collects data on food expenditure. 
Using these data, we calculate the growth rate of consumption (GC). The distribution of 
GC shows that GC has more variation than GY(1) and GY(2).16
 
 
3.3.3. Expected income change 
The expected income change is a key variable for our paper, because it is used for both 
the rational expectations test and the excess sensitivity test. The PLiSS collects the 
expected income growth rate (EGY) directly. The wording of the EGY question is as 
follows: 
 
By how much do you estimate that the annual earned gross income of your 
entire household in 2010 will change compared with the amount in 2009? (1) 
Increase by more than 9%, (2) Increase by 7%–9%, (3) Increase by 5%–7%, 
(4) Increase by 3%–5%, (5) Increase by 1%–3%, (6) Increase by less than 1% 
or decrease by less than 1%, (7) Decrease by 1%–3%, (8) Decrease by 3%–5%, 
                                                 
15 See Figures A-1 and A-2 in Appendix 3. 
16 See Figure B in Appendix 3. 
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(9) Decrease by 5%–7%, (10) Decrease by 7%–9%, (11) Decrease by more 
than 9%. 
 
We replace these data categories with the midpoint values of each range. We 
also replace the top-code categories with 0.1125 (0.09 × 1.25) and –0.1125, respectively. 
The distribution of EGY is shown in Figure 1. It is seen that 11% of the observations are 
in the top categories. We provide robust results that handle this issue in the test of the 
REH. 
 
[Figure 1] 
 
4. Rational expectations test 
Many authors have suggested various models to empirically test the REH. We follow 
the model used in Das and van Soest (1999). Let  denote the expected income 
growth and let  represent actual income growth where i is the household index 
and t is the time index (t = 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009). Under the REH, 
expected income growth would be equal to the realized income growth, on average. To 
test this hypothesis, we introduce the following empirical model: 
 
. (1) 
 
This is the benchmark model. If the REH holds, we have β = 1 and α = 0. 
Next, we add the year dummies, µt, to the empirical model (1) to account for 
macroeconomic shocks. 
 
. (2) 
 
We should note that our data could not identify macro-economic shocks and 
non-rational expectations. If the forecast error is not averaged out, the estimated 
constant term and the estimated coefficients of the year dummies are sometimes 
significantly different from zero. Thus, our data make it difficult to evaluate the 
estimated coefficients of the constant term and the year dummies. 
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Empirical model (2) assumes that macro-economic shocks affect all 
households’ income changes equally. However, the effects of macro-economic shocks 
could differ by socio-economic attributes. For example, the effects of macro-economic 
shocks differ between low education and high education individuals. To handle this 
point, we introduce the empirical model (3), which allows for heterogeneous effects 
from aggregate shocks. We add the following to the model: a dummy for the interaction 
of year and respondent age, a dummy for respondent education, and the first lag of the 
logarithm of the family income level. 
 
 (3) 
 
where s is group index split by age, education, and family income. 
We estimate equations (1), (2), and (3) using an ordinary least squares (OLS) 
model and a random effects model. We do not estimate using fixed effects because fixed 
effects models assume that the estimates of forecast error of income are persistent even 
with short panel data. This assumption is not valid for our aim of detecting the 
households for whom the REH holds. 
 
5. Excess sensitivity test 
5.1. Euler equation 
We introduce the following Euler equation that is commonly used to test the LCPIH. 
 
 
 (4) 
 
where i is the household index,  is a measure of consumption excluding durable 
goods,  includes predictable indicators of household preferences such as age, 
 is the real after-tax rate of interest, 1/ρ is the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution, δ is the rate of time preference,  is the expectation operator, and  
is the forecast error.17
                                                 
17 The notation of this model follows Jappelli and Pistaferri (2000). 
 Equation (4) is derived assuming that preferences are iso-elastic 
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and that the distributions of the real interest rate and the consumption growth are jointly 
lognormal. Under these assumptions, we have equation (4) as a second-order 
approximation of the first-order condition of the consumer dynamic optimization 
problem. 
The Euler equation implies that the predicted income change does not help in 
explaining consumption growth regardless of whether the income changes are 
permanent or temporary. Because the LCPIH predicts that the household will change its 
consumption at the time it anticipates its future income change and that this behavior 
will apply for both permanent and temporary anticipated income changes. This 
implication facilitates the testing of the LCPIH. Thus, many studies in the literature add 
the predicted income change to the Euler equation and test the relationship between the 
predicted income change and consumption growth.18
 
 
5.2. Estimation issues19
A degree of caution must be used in conducting the excess sensitivity test, even though 
this test is simple and convenient. First, obtaining the predicted income change using 
panel data is rare. Second, the conditional variance of consumption cannot be observed. 
Ludvigson and Paxson (1997) and Carroll (2000) cautioned that omitting the 
conditional variance would cause serious bias when estimating the Euler equation. Third, 
excess sensitivity may result from a failure to control properly for the inseparability of 
consumption and leisure. Finally, excess sensitivity may result in a spurious correlation 
because of misspecification of the stochastic structure of the forecast error. 
 
 
5.2.1. Predicting income growth 
Testing for excess sensitivity requires that the predicted growth in income be known. To 
obtain this variable, three approaches have been proposed: out-of-sample information, 
two-sample instrumental variable techniques, and subjective income expectations. The 
limitations of these approaches have been discussed in the literature.20
 
 Using subjective 
income expectations is the best approach, because instrumental variable methods can be 
problematic if the researcher omits critical information related to the income 
expectation. Thus, we use expected family income growth (EGY) obtained from the 
PLiSS. 
5.2.2. The conditional variance of consumption growth 
                                                 
18 We should note that the effect of a temporary income change should be smaller than that of a 
permanent one. 
19 The discussion in this subsection largely follows Jappelli and Pistaferri (2000). 
20 See, for example, Browning and Lusardi (1996) and Jappelli and Pistaferri (2000). 
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If the utility function shows decreasing risk aversion, prudent households react to the 
expected consumption risk, which is the conditional variance of consumption growth in 
equation (4), by reducing consumption in period t relative to period t+1. As the 
omission of an expected consumption risk could cause serious bias in the Euler equation 
estimates, some studies introduced explicit proxies for the conditional variance of 
consumption growth. For example, Jappelli and Pistaferri (2000) used the conditional 
variance of expected nominal income growth, and Kohara and Horioka (2006) used the 
conditional variance of expenditure growth excluding durable goods. 
We use the conditional variance of expected total family expenditure (VAR). 
This variable has at least two advantages compared with the variables used in past 
studies. First, expected consumption growth is better than expected income growth in 
terms of rigorously estimating equation (4). Second, the conditional variance of 
consumption growth is an endogenous variable, whereas expected consumption growth 
is exogenous. Using expected consumption growth requires that endogeneity bias be 
accounted for in the model. 
 
5.2.3. Separability of consumption and leisure 
If leisure is an argument of the household utility function and if consumption and leisure 
are inseparable, then current consumption decisions are affected by predictable changes 
in the household labor supply. We use the change in the number of workers in 
households (∆WORKER) as a control variable, as also done by Jappelli and Pistaferri 
(2000). However, this variable can be problematic in that ∆WORKER might be 
simultaneously determined with the current change in consumption. The ideal control 
variable to capture this effect is the expected change in the total hours of work in the 
household, but our data are not available. 
 
5.2.4. The stochastic structure of the forecast errors 
According to the LCPIH, the error term of the Euler equation must be zero. If the 
forecast error is the sum of an aggregate shock and of an idiosyncratic shock, then the 
orthogonal condition fails in a short panel even if the LCPIH is true (Chamberlin, 1984; 
Souleles, 2004). Aggregate shocks induce a cross-sectional correlation between 
expected consumption growth and predicted income growth. The problem is sometimes 
handled by including time dummies in the Euler equation. This approach, nevertheless, 
is restrictive, because it eliminates the possibility that the aggregate shocks are not 
evenly distributed among the population. 
To capture the individual effect of aggregate shocks on consumption growth, 
we explicitly introduce the interaction of year dummies with the forecast error of 
consumption change (ERROR), which is calculated by subtracting growth of expected 
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total family expenditure (EGTC) from growth of total family expenditure including 
durables (GTC).21
The standard Euler equation, for example the model proposed by Hall (1978), 
implies that consumption is affected only by unpredictable shocks. Therefore, previous 
studies usually assume that the disturbance implicitly includes the forecast error of 
consumption change (ERROR). In this paper, we explicitly control ERROR to 
overcome the forecast error caused by a short panel of unobserved household 
characteristics. 
 
 
5.3. Estimation model 
We present an empirical model that addresses the estimation issues discussed above: 
 
 
 (5) 
 
where  denotes the change in family size from period t to t+1,  is 
an age dummy,  is the change in number of workers,  is the 
conditional variance of expected total family expenditure,  is the forecast 
error of total family expenditure including durable goods,  is a year dummy, and 
 is the error term with a mean of zero and independently identically distributed.
 When the LCPIH holds, previously expected income has no effect on current 
expenditure growth. In addition, the standard LCPIH predicts that only permanent 
macroeconomic shocks affect consumption change. However, in some cases, temporary 
macroeconomic shocks affect temporary consumption Examples are an incomplete 
financial market, the presence of liquidity constraints, and a failure of model 
specifications. 
 
6. Empirical results 
To investigate our hypotheses, we first test the REH for the whole sample and then for 
subsamples made by dividing the sample by proxies for forward-looking behavior. We 
then conduct the excess sensitivity test for subsamples made by dividing the sample by 
                                                 
21 The distributions of GTC and EGC are provided in Figures C-1 and C-2 of Appendix 3, 
respectively. 
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proxies for forward-looking behavior, self-control problems, and use of commitment 
devices, which indicates that a household is sophisticated. 
 
6.1. Empirical results of rational expectations test 
6.1.1. Benchmark empirical results 
Before we present the estimation results for equations (1) and (2), we present visual 
evidence of the degree of precision in predicting future income. We first show the 
means of GY(1), GY(2), and EGY by year in Figure 2. The mean of EGY in 2005 is 
expected growth in family income from 2004 to 2005, which is calculated based on 
2004 data. While the trend in GY(1) runs parallel to that of EGY until 2007, the means 
of GY(1) decrease from 2008. This decrease is intuitively consistent with the effect of 
the global financial crisis in those years. The means of GY(2) are in line with those of 
GY(1). The similarity of these trends implies that the measurement error of GY(1) 
might be negligible. 
 
[Figure 2] 
 
To confirm people’s predictions, on average, we provide a forecast error of 
family income change in Figure 3. The forecast error is calculated by subtracting the 
actual family income growth rate from the expected family income growth rate 
predicted in the previous period. The expected errors of GY(1) are not statistically 
different from zero at the 5% significance level from 2005 to 2007. From 2008 to 2009, 
actual family income growth is less than the expected income growth. Based on Figure 
2, we conjecture that this negative forecast error arises because of an unexpected 
income decrease. 
 
[Figure 3] 
 
Table 2 shows the empirical results of equations (1) and (2). The dependent 
variable of models (1) and (2) is GY(1) and the dependent variable of models (3) and 
(4) is GY(2). As mentioned above, GY(1) might have a measurement error in the 
calculation of the growth rate because of the use of a categorical variable. We estimate 
models (3) and (4) to address this measurement error using GY(2). However, as GY(2) 
is a shorter panel, it could be more strongly influenced by a macroeconomic shock than 
GY(1). Furthermore, the fact that GY(2) is not total family income is another issue in 
estimating GY(2). We estimate all models using an OLS model and a random effects 
model. The results of the specification test between the OLS and the random effects 
models show that OLS is appropriate for estimation; we therefore present the OLS 
results. 
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[Table 2] 
 
As can be seen in Table 2, the coefficients of EGY are almost equal to one in 
all of the models. These results indicate that EGY is a suitable predictor for future 
family income. The effects of the year dummies in 2008, 2009, and 2010 are negative 
and significant in model (2). These are consistent with the trends shown in Figure 3. The 
last row in Table 2 shows the Wald test statistics. The null hypothesis of the Wald test is 
that the coefficient of EGY are equal to one, that the coefficients of the dummy 
variables for each year are equal to zero, and that the constant term is equal to zero. The 
results of the Wald test indicate that the REH does not hold in all models. Our data are 
from a short panel and, as shown in Figures 2 and 3, the macroeconomic conditions 
from 2008 to 2010 are unstable. These facts suggest that our results might be influenced 
by macroeconomic shocks. 
 
[Table 3] 
 
Next, we estimate equation (3) to address the issue of the forecast error in short 
panel data, and we estimate equation (4), which accounts for group heterogeneous 
macroeconomic shocks. The results are presented in Table 3. The coefficients of EGY in 
models (1) and (3) are not statistically different from one. In addition, the magnitudes of 
the coefficients are not statistically different from the estimates in Table 2. 
EGY is a superior expectation variable to the variables used in previous studies. 
The survey question on EGY contained 11 categories to capture the range of income 
growth, whereas in previous papers such as Das and van Soest (1999), only five 
categories were used. However, when using a categorical variable, we must attach an 
arbitrary number to the top codes, and changes in the top-coding number could alter the 
empirical results.22
To overcome this problem, we estimate models (2) and (4) in Table 3. The 
coefficient of EGY without the top and bottom categories is 0.90, and it is not 
statistically different from one. By contrast, in model (4), the coefficient is 0.52 and it is 
statistically different from one. As shown in Figures 2 and 3, the macroeconomic 
conditions from 2008 to 2010 are unstable. The estimation of GY(2) could likely be 
influenced by top-coding because of the shorter panel. For this reason, the results of 
GY(1) might be reliable. 
 
                                                 
22 We estimate several models to attach top (bottom) categories to the following numbers: 0.1 (–0.1), 
0.11 (–0.11), 0.12 (–0.12), 0.13 (–0.13). The results are almost the same as those in Tables 2 and 3. 
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As discussed in Section 4, it is difficult to interpret the estimates of the constant 
term and the coefficients of the year dummies because our panel data are short and our 
empirical model has some strong assumptions. If π = 1 means that the REH holds, our 
results do not reject the hypothesis for our full sample. 
 
6.1.2. Empirical results according to forward-looking behavior 
Proxies for forward-looking behavior 
As discussed in Section 2.1, the forecast error could provide spurious results for an 
unbiased prediction test. To overcome the forecast error problem, we define the REH as 
forward-looking behavior with unbiased prediction of own income profile. 
Forward-looking agents make decisions based on intertemporal utility maximization. By 
contrast, non-forward-looking agents do not look ahead and do not make dynamic 
consumption plans. Our definition of the REH requires both conditions. 
In this definition, we can separate our sample into a forward-looking group and 
a non-forward-looking group. We conduct unbiased prediction tests in each group. We 
expect that only the group that consists of forward-looking households will predict 
future income changes precisely. To detect this behavior in household-level data, we use 
two self-reported questions in the PLiSS. The first question directly asks households 
about their planning behavior by inviting survey participants to respond to the following 
general statement: “I always plan things before I actually do them.” The answer is given 
on a five-item scale (“Completely agree” = 5, “Somewhat agree” = 4, “Neither agree 
nor disagree” = 3, “Somewhat disagree” = 2, and “Completely disagree” = 1). We call 
this variable Always plan. The distribution of the responses is shown in Figure 4. Based 
on the responses, we divide the households into two groups. The first group (Yes) 
consists of households that choose “4” or “5”; they account for 23% of the observations. 
The remaining households make up the second group (No). 
 
[Figure 4] 
 
The second question asks the survey participants about their planning behavior 
for after retirement. The question is worded as follows: 
 
Do you have a savings plan for after the household head retires? (If the 
household head has already retired, do you have a savings plan for the future?) 
(1) I have a specific plan 
(2) I have a rough plan. 
(3) I do not have a plan now, but I am going to make a plan in the future. 
(4) I do not have a plan now, and I am not going to make a plan in the future. 
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The distribution of the responses is shown in Figure 5. It is natural to divide the 
households based on whether or not they have made a plan. We set a dummy variable 
that takes a value of one if the household chooses “I have a specific plan” or “I have a 
rough plan” and zero otherwise. We call this dummy variable Retirement plan. About 
43% of households answered that they had a specific or rough plan (Yes). 
 
[Figure 5] 
 
 
Empirical results 
We use two proxy variables, (A) Always plan and (B) Retirement plan, to identify 
individual forward-looking behavior. Table 4 presents the empirical results of the REH 
test split by these proxies. Part (A) presents the results of the REH test split according to 
Always plan, and (B) gives the results split according to Retirement plan. The empirical 
model we use is the same as model (2) in Table 3. From part (A), we confirm that the 
households that do not have a plan overestimate their future income changes. By 
contrast, households with a plan suitably predict their future income changes. However, 
the results in part (B) show that the accuracy of prediction behavior does not differ 
between the households that have a plan for after retirement and the households that do 
not have such a plan. The results in Table 4 partly confirm our hypothesis that 
forward-looking households are likely to predict their future income changes more 
precisely. A comparison of (A) Always plan with (B) Retirement plan shows that (A) 
Always plan captures more general forward-looking behavior than (B) Retirement plan. 
(B) Retirement plan represents one aspect of forward-looking behavior. 
 
[Table 4] 
 
 
6.2. Empirical results of the excess sensitivity test 
6.2.1. Benchmark empirical results 
Table 5 provides the results of the excess sensitivity test. The results for models (1) to 
(3) use the whole sample and the results for models (4) to (6) exclude 
liquidity-constrained households. The results of the F-test and Wu–Hausman test show 
that the OLS model with clustered robust standard error is appropriate to be estimated 
against the fixed effects model and the random effects model. 
 
[Table 5] 
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First, we confirm the results for the whole sample. The coefficient of EGY is 
0.36 and is significant at the 5% level in model (1). The magnitudes of excess 
sensitivity are fairly consistent with previous studies. The coefficient of ∆FAMILY is 
positive and significant. The coefficient of the proxy for consumption risk, VAR, and 
the coefficient of ∆WORKER are not significant. These results imply that the 
assumption of separability of leisure and consumption is valid, and a precautionary 
saving theory is rejected. These results are consistent with Jappelli and Pistaferri (2000). 
As discussed in Sections 2.1 and 5.2, the forecast error could induce a bias in testing 
any dynamic model that assumes the REH. To address this issue, we add ERROR to 
model (1). 23
Under liquidity constraints, the responses of consumption to predicted income 
changes should be asymmetric (Altonji and Siow, 1987). If liquidity constraints cause 
excess sensitivity, only the coefficient of expected income up (EGY_up) should be 
positive and significant. Under the LCPIH, while liquidity-constrained households who 
decrease their consumption in response to anticipated income declines, they cannot 
increase it by responding to anticipated income increases because they face liquidity 
constraints. Model (3) in Table 5 presents the results of the asymmetric model. We find 
that the coefficient of EGY_up is 0.63 and significant, whereas that of EGY_down is 
0.25 and not significant. The response to increasing predicted income change is larger 
than the response to decreasing predicted income change. This result indicates that 
liquidity constraints cause excess sensitivity. This result also suggests that 
rule-of-thumb behavior is not the main cause of the excess sensitivity because the 
responses of EGY_up and EGY_down to consumption are not of the same magnitude 
(Flavin, 1985). 
 Whereas the standard consumption model, proposed by Hall (1978), 
indicates that forecast errors of consumption affect consumption change, the results for 
model (2) show that the coefficients of ERROR are significant at the 5% level only in 
2008 and 2010. This result might arise because of working formal or informal insurance 
mechanisms.  
Furthermore, to check the robustness of the liquidity-constraints results, we 
provide the results for the subsample that excludes liquidity-constrained households. We 
identify liquidity-constrained households using the following question: “Have you ever 
had a loan application rejected (excluding housing loans)?” We define a household as 
liquidity constrained if the respondent answers “Yes” to this question. Seven percent of 
households are thus defined as liquidity constrained. This proportion is slightly less than 
that in Kohara and Horioka (2006), who find that 8%–15% of young married Japanese 
households are liquidity constrained. We can identify two possible reasons for the 
                                                 
23 ERROR is calculated by subtracting growth of expected total family expenditure (EGTC) from 
growth of total family expenditure including durables (GTC). 
 20 
slightly smaller proportion in our study. First, Kohara and Horioka use a sample of 
young married Japanese households, whereas our sample represents a wider age 
distribution of Japanese households. Second, our proxy variable underestimates the 
number of liquidity-constrained households. Our classification of liquidity constraints 
has the following limitations. First, we assume that the economic status of households 
has not changed since their loan applications were rejected. Second, we do not take into 
account the households who could potentially be rejected for loan applications. 
For models (4) to (6) in Table 5, we provide the results when 
liquidity-constrained households are excluded. The results for models (4) and (5) show 
that the coefficients of EGY are significant at the 5% level. In model (6), we confirm 
that the coefficients of EGY_up and EGY_down are not significant. This result is 
almost the same as that for model (3). These results imply that factors apart from 
liquidity constraints induce co-movements between consumption change and expected 
income change. 
 
6.2.2. Empirical results by forward-looking behavior 
Proxies for forward-looking behavior 
As discussed in Section 2.1, we test the LCPIH for households for which the REH holds. 
To examine this, we conduct the excess sensitivity test on groups divided according to 
their responses to proxies for forward-looking behavior. We use (A) Always plan and 
(B) Retirement plan. The results of the REH test in Table 4 indicate that Always plan 
could also serve as a good proxy for whether REH holds or not. 
 
Empirical results 
Table 6 presents the empirical results of the excess sensitivity test for the sample 
divided according to forward-looking behavior. Panel A contains the empirical results 
for the whole sample, and panel B contains those for the subsample of 
liquidity-unconstrained households. Part (A) provides the results divided according to 
Always plan, and part (B) gives the results divided according to Retirement plan. 
 
[Table 6] 
 
Except for the results in part (A), the consumption of households that have 
forward-looking behavior does not respond to anticipated income change. By contrast, 
we find excess sensitivity for households that are likely not to make a plan. Especially 
in part (A), the coefficient of EGY for the households that answered “No” is larger than 
that for households that answered “Yes” and is significant even though the sample for 
“No” is smaller than that for “Yes”. Furthermore, these results do not change even if we 
exclude liquidity-constrained households. These results indicate that a consumption 
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behavior consistent with the LCPIH relates to the characteristics of forward-looking 
behavior, which is a proxy for upholding the REH in this paper. Thus, we confirm that 
the LCPIH assumption is not rejected if we limit our sample; this is consistent with the 
LCPIH assumption in terms of the REH. 
 
6.2.3. Self-control problems 
Measuring self-control problems 
Self-control problems are the main reason for the rejection of the LCPIH, as many 
studies have pointed out. To elicit self-control problems, we use three questions in the 
PLiSS. The first question is answered on a five-item scale, as with Always plan. The 
statement is as follows: 
 
When I have something I want, I cannot bear not buying it. 
 
We call this response Cannot bear not buying. It contains characteristics of 
impulsiveness. The distribution of this response is shown in Figure 6. As for Always 
plan, we divide the households into two groups. We classify households as having 
self-control problems if they agree or somewhat agree with Cannot bear not buying; 
such households account for 21% of the sample. 
 
[Figure 6] 
 
The second question is answered on the same five-item scale as Cannot bear 
not buying. It is worded as follows: 
 
Even if I make plans, I end up procrastinating. 
 
We call this response End up procrastinating. The distribution of this response is shown 
in Figure 7. The distribution of End up procrastinating has more symmetry than that of 
Cannot bear not buying. End up procrastinating is also divided into two groups; 32% of 
the sample answer “Yes” for End up procrastinating. 
 
[Figure 7] 
 
The final proxy variable for self-control problems consists of two questions in 
relation to completion of homework: (1) “When did you plan to do your assignments?” 
(Plan); (2) “When did you do your assignments?” (Actual).24
                                                 
24 The full wordings of these questions are given in Appendix 2. 
 The responses to and 
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distribution of these questions are in Figure 8. As shown for the Plan responses in 
Figure 8, the proportion of those who answered “Got it done right away” was the 
highest. By contrast, for the Actual responses, which indicate the reality of the 
assignment completion, more than 40% of households answered that they “Got it done 
at the last minute”. These responses show that many households intended to do their 
assignments almost right away, but they ended up procrastinating. We use the responses 
to these questions to divide the sample into three groups: (1) can execute the plan (No); 
(2) cannot execute the plan (Yes); and (3) did not make any plans (Not plan). “No” 
refers to households finished their assignments earlier than they planned, and “Yes” is 
for households that could not finish their assignments earlier than they planned. “Not 
plan” is used for households that answered that “I didn’t make any plans”. We call this 
variable Cannot execute plan. About 35% of households are in the group “can execute 
the plan” (No) and 58% of households are in the group “cannot execute the plan” (Yes). 
In each proxy for self-control problems, we confirm that the majority of households 
have a self-control problem. 
 
[Figure 8] 
 
Empirical results 
Table 7 presents the empirical results of the excess sensitivity test divided according to 
three proxy variables: (I) Cannot bear not buying; (II) End up procrastinating; (III) 
Cannot execute plan. All results provide evidence that the coefficients of EGY are 
positive and significant for households with self-control problems. By contrast, the 
LCPIH implication is not rejected for households without self-control problems. 
Furthermore, the broad results are unchanged even if we eliminate the 
liquidity-constrained sample. These results imply that, if we focus on households 
without self-control problems, which the standard consumption model assumes, the 
LCPIH implication is not violated. The results also suggest that self-control might be a 
critical factor in inducing excess sensitivity. 
 
[Table 7] 
 
6.2.4. Results of excess sensitivity test for the subsample that is consistent with the 
LCPIH assumptions 
In Sections 6.2.2 and 6.2.3, we examined the LCPIH implication in households for 
which the REH holds and that do not have self-control problems, respectively. As 
expected, the results in Tables 6 and 7 show that the LCPIH holds for the subsample in 
which the LCPIH assumptions are valid. In this subsection, we conduct the excess 
sensitivity test jointly considering both postulates. 
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[Table 8] 
 
Table 8 presents the results of the excess sensitivity test according to proxies 
both for forward-looking behavior and for having self-control problems. To identify the 
effects of liquidity constraints and violation of LCPIH assumptions, we exclude 
liquidity-constrained households.25
We estimate the same model as model (5) in Table 5 using OLS in each cell. 
Clustered robust standard errors are in parentheses and the numbers of observations and 
the proportions of observations are in brackets. For example, we can see the distribution 
of our sample using (A) Always plan and (I) Cannot bear not buying, which tells us that 
58% of households enter both “Yes” for (A) and “No” for (I). The proportion of 
households that answer that they do not plan and can bear not buying is 22%, whereas 
7% of households answer that they both do not plan and cannot bear not buying. In each 
combination, the proportion of rational consumers ranges from 18% to 58%, which is 
fairly larger than in other cells. 
 The columns are divided according to proxies that 
uphold the REH: (A) Always plan and (B) Retirement plan. The rows are divided by 
proxies for having self-control problems: (I) Cannot bear not buying; (II) End up 
procrastinating; and (III) Cannot execute plan. Thus, we make six combinations using 
these two types of proxies. Our focus is on the upper-left coefficients of EGY in each 
combination; these are consistent with the LCPIH assumption that households have 
rational expectations and no self-control problems. 
We confirm that, for each result divided by proxies, excess sensitivity is not 
observed for the subsample that is consistent with the LCPIH assumptions. Furthermore, 
conditioning each proxy for forward-looking behavior, we find that the magnitudes of 
excess sensitivity are larger for households who answer that they are facing self-control 
problems. The results suggest that self-control problems might matter more than the 
validity of the REH. This result is convincing, considering the finding that the REH 
holds for the whole sample. 
 
6.2.5. Sophisticated and naïve households 
Measuring sophisticated and naïve households 
As discussed in Section 2.2, people with self-control problems can be classified as 
sophisticated or naïve. We define sophisticated households as those that use 
commitment devices to execute ex ante plans, and naïve households as those that do not 
use commitment devices because they are not aware of their self-control problems. To 
                                                 
25 Results for the whole sample are given in Table B in Appendix 4. 
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identify sophisticated and naïve households, we use  (1) Have cash and (2) Use 
incentives to finish assignments. 
The first proxy is identified using the question on whether a household has cash 
savings. If a household is sophisticated and aware of its self-control problems in relation 
to overconsumption, it would not have unnecessary cash at hand. Therefore, 
sophisticated households should not have cash savings. We construct a dummy variable 
called Have cash, which takes a value of one if the household has cash (Yes) and zero 
otherwise. The proportion of sophisticated households is 74%. 
The second proxy variable, Use incentives to finish assignments, is constructed 
using the following retrospective question called Types of incentives: 
 
As a child, what types of incentives did you use to finish your 
assignments on time? 
 (Select all options if you apply) 
 
The response options for this question and the proportions of responses are given in 
Figure 9. As the figure shows, nearly half of the respondents answered “I did not follow 
any specific regimen”. About 20% of respondents answered “I put a homework 
schedule in a place where I would see it” and “4. I tried to sit at my desk at the same 
time each day”. 
 
[Figure 9] 
 
If respondents are sophisticated, they should have executed their ex ante 
homework schedules using some commitment devices. We estimate a probit model to 
determine which choices of Types of incentives contribute to the execution. From 
Cannot execute plan, we can identify respondents who acuallyexecuted their schedule. 
We use this as the dependent variable, Cannot execute plan, which takes a value of one 
if the response is “Yes” and zero if it is “No”. The independent variables are choices of 
Types of incentives, age dummy, and female dummy. Table C in Appendix 5 shows the 
marginal effects estimated by the probit model. The coefficients of the variables “I put a 
homework schedule in a place where I would see it” and “I tried to sit at my desk at the 
same time each day” are positive and significant at the 1% level. Our results suggest 
that other incentives do not contribute to overcoming self-control problems. Therefore, 
we construct a proxy variable for sophisticated households, Use incentives to finish 
assignments, that takes a value of one if respondents selected “I put a homework 
schedule in a place where I would see it” or “I tried to sit at my desk at the same time 
each day” and zero otherwise. According to the variable Use incentives to finish 
assignments, 38% of households are sophisticated. 
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Note that our proxies catch only one aspect of the characteristics of 
sophisticated households. However, few empirical studies have examined consumption 
behavior taking into account self-control problems. Therefore, despite the limitations of 
our proxies, we believe that our new evidence on personal behavioral aspects 
contributes to refining consumption theory. 
 
Empirical results 
Economic theory predicts that the consumption of the sophisticated households will not 
respond to expected income changes because such households use commitment devices 
to overcome their self-control problems (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999; 2001). Panel A 
in Table 9 shows the result using Not have cash and Panel B provides the results using 
Not use incentives to finish assignments. We exclude liquidity-constrained households 
from Table 9.26
As expected, the results of the whole sample in both Panels A and B show that 
the coefficient of EGY is positive and significant at the 1% level for naïve households 
that do not use commitment devices, but it is not significant for sophisticated 
households that use commitment devices. The results split by (I) Cannot bear not 
buying show that the excess sensitivity is not observed in the households who use a 
commitment device. The results in Panel B for (II) End up procrastinating and (III) 
Cannot execute plan show that excess sensitivity does not exist for sophisticated 
households but does exist for naïve households. From the results in Panel A for (II) and 
(III), we find that the consumption of sophisticated households responds to expected 
income changes. However, the magnitudes of the responses of sophisticated households 
are smaller than those of naïve households. 
 
 
[Table 9] 
 
Our results are generally consistent with our hypothesis that the LCPIH 
implication is not rejected for sophisticated households because they use commitment 
devices. Although our proxies represent narrow aspects of the behavior of sophisticated 
households, our results show that the consumption behavior of sophisticated households 
is different from that of naïve households. 
 
7. Conclusions 
In this paper, we examine whether the LCPIH holds for households whose behavior is 
consistent with the assumptions of the LCPIH. In particular, we focus on the following 
                                                 
26 The results for the whole sample, given in Table D in Appendix 6, are almost the same as those 
shown in Table 9. 
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two postulates: (1) people have rational expectations; and (2) households do not have 
self-control problems. These are implicitly assumed in the standard LCPIH. We use 
Japanese panel data from the PLiSS, which has two advantages for conducting the 
excess sensitivity test and for detecting the preferences of households in relation to the 
LCPIH assumptions. The first advantage is that the PLiSS data make it possible to 
procure subjective expectations of income growth rate, which are valuable not only to 
conduct the excess sensitivity test but also to test the REH. The second advantage is that 
the PLiSS contains several self-reported and retrospective questions to elicit individuals’ 
characteristics concerning such aspects as forward-looking behavior, self-control 
problems, and the use of commitment devices. 
First, to examine whether the REH holds for our sample, we regress the actual 
income changes on expected income changes (unbiased prediction test). Our results of 
the REH test show that the REH holds for the whole sample. Although some previous 
studies provide evidence of the rejection of the REH, our results show that the REH is 
not an irrelevant assumption in any dynamic decision-making model. We also find that, 
as expected, the households that have forward-looking behavior can predict their future 
income changes, whereas households that do not have forward-looking behavior cannot. 
This result indicates that our proxies are successful and useful in eliciting characteristics 
related to the REH. 
Next, we test the LCPIH implication and find that the LCPIH implication is 
rejected in the sense that excess sensitivity exists both for the whole sample and for the 
subsample of liquidity-unconstrained households. To test our hypothesis, we used 
self-reported and retrospective questions to identify households for which the REH 
holds and that do not have self-control problems. Our results show that the LCPIH 
implication is not rejected for households whose behavior is consistent with the LCPIH 
assumptions. Furthermore, we confirmed that excess sensitivity becomes larger for 
naïve households than for sophisticated ones. As the LCPIH predicts, if the assumptions 
of the LCPIH are satisfied, then the LCPIH implication is not violated. 
Our results are consistent with the theoretical predictions. Thus, our results 
imply that LCPIH is reasonable benchmark model to describe consumption behavior. 
Furthermore, our results using several proxy variables indicate that responses to 
self-reported and retrospective questions are not meaningless when eliciting 
characteristics of households. 
Finally, we review some limitations of our analyses and discuss directions for 
future research. First, even though we use several self-reported and retrospective 
questions to provide robust results, the data might not allow us to obtain completely 
convincing results. A particular issue when using self-reported questions about 
self-control problems is the potential inconsistency between the behavior described in 
the responses and actual behavior. We hope to overcome these limitations in future 
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research, for example, by comparing survey data and experimental data. Second, we do 
not analyze the causation between survey responses and behavior. We implicitly assume 
that people respond to survey questions according to their behavior. However, survey 
responses could influence household’s behavior. Finally, our paper assumes that the 
preferences are time-invariant. However, some papers have shown the possibility that 
preferences can change over time. The analysis of causation is also left for future 
research. We hope that future research will overcome these limitations. 
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Appendix 1. Distribution of observations by year 
 
[Table A] 
 
 
Appendix 2. Survey questions on income 
GY(1) 
1 Less than 1,000,000 yen 7 10,000,000 to less than 12,000,000 yen 
2 1,000,000 to less than 2,000,000 yen 8 12,000,000 to less than 14,000,000 yen 
3 2,000,000 to less than 4,000,000 yen 9 14,000,000 to less than 16,000,000 yen 
4 4,000,000 to less than 6,000,000 yen  10 16,000,000 to less than 18,000,000 yen 
5 6,000,000 to less than 8,000,000 yen  11 18,000,000 to less than 20,000,000 yen 
6 8,000,000 to less than 10,000,000 yen  12 More than 20,000,000 yen 
 
GY(2) 
Approximately how much was your and your spouse’s salary for 2009 (including 
business income if you are self-employed)? 
You: Salary per month _____ _____ _____ yen 
Your spouse: Salary per month _____ _____ _____ yen 
 
Plan 
Thinking about when you were a child and you were given an assignment in school, 
when did you usually do the assignment? 
1 Got it done right away 4 
Tended to get it done toward the 
end 
2 
Tended to get it done early, before the due 
date 
5 Got it done at the last minute 
3 Worked on it daily up until the due date   
 
Actual 
Thinking about when you were a child and you were given an assignment in school, 
when did you plan to do your assignment? 
1 I planned to get it done right away 4 
I planned to get it done rather toward the 
end 
2 
I planned to get it done rather early, 
before the due date 
5 I planned to get it done at the last minute 
3 
I planned to work on it daily up until 
the due date 
 I didn't make any plans 
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Appendix 3. Distribution of GY(1), GY(2), GC, GTC, and EGC 
 
[Figure A-1] 
[Figure A-2] 
[Figure B] 
[Figure C-1] 
[Figure C-2] 
 
 
Appendix 4. Excess sensitivity test by forward-looking behavior and self-control 
problems (whole sample) 
 
[Table B] 
 
 
Appendix 5. Empirical results of Cannot execute plan and Types of incentives 
 
[Table C] 
 
 
Appendix 6. Empirical results of Sophisticated vs. naïve households (whole sample) 
 
 [Table D] 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
  Mean  S.D.  Min  Max  
Female dummy 0.51  0.50  0.00  1.00  
Age 52.68  11.30  24.00  77.00  
 –≦29 0.01  0.11  0.00  1.00  
 30–34 0.04  0.20  0.00  1.00  
 35–39 0.09  0.29  0.00  1.00  
 40–44 0.12  0.33  0.00  1.00  
 45–49 0.14  0.35  0.00  1.00  
 50–54 0.14  0.35  0.00  1.00  
 55–59 0.15  0.36  0.00  1.00  
 60–64 0.13  0.33  0.00  1.00  
 65+ 0.18  0.38  0.00  1.00  
Education level 
    
 Junior high school 0.11  0.31  0.00  1.00  
 High school 0.49  0.50  0.00  1.00  
 Some college 0.16  0.36  0.00  1.00  
 University/College 0.25  0.43  0.00  1.00  
Income 
    
 GY(1): Family’s total annual income change rate –0.02  0.41  –3.91  3.40  
 GY(2): Sum of respondent’s and spouse’s 
 monthly income change rate 
–0.03  0.32  –2.71  2.40  
Expenditure 
    
 GC: Family’s expenditure change rate without durables –0.02  0.68  –3.87  4.25  
 GTC: Family’s total expenditure change rate 0.01  0.05  –0.11  0.11  
Expectation variable 
    
 EGY: Family’s expected total income change rate –0.01  0.04  –0.11  0.11  
 EGTC: Family’s expected total expenditure change rate 0.01  0.05  –0.11  0.11  
∆FAMILY: Change in family size –0.04  0.59  –6.00  5.00  
∆WORKER: Change in number of workers –0.01  0.36  –1.00  1.00  
VAR: Variance of EGTC×100 0.21  0.26  0.00  2.53  
Liquidity-constraint dummy 0.07  0.26  0.00  1.00  
Note: Number of observations is 7,128 except for GY(2), with 2,859 observations. 
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Table 2. The REH test 
Dependent variable  GY(1) 
 
GY(2) 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
EGY 1.15*** 1.16*** 
 
0.98*** 1.02*** 
 
(0.13) (0.13) 
 
(0.15) (0.15) 
YD2006 
 
–0.03  
   
  
(0.02) 
   
YD2007 
 
–0.01  
   
  
(0.02) 
   
YD2008 
 
–0.05** 
   
  
(0.02) 
   
YD2009 
 
–0.06*** 
  
–0.03  
  
(0.02) 
  
(0.02) 
YD2010 
 
–0.03* 
  
0.01  
  
(0.02) 
  
(0.01) 
Constant –0.01*** 0.02  
 
–0.02*** –0.01  
 
(0.00) (0.02) 
 
(0.01) (0.01) 
F-test statistics 0.66  0.67  
 
0.91  0.91  
Wu–Hausman test statistics 0.67  2.58  
 
5.83  7.96  
Wald test statistics 6.32  4.26  
 
5.95  4.82  
Note: The numbers of observations (households) in models (1) and (2) are 7,128 (2,857) 
and those in models (3) and (4) are 2,859 (1,934). All models are estimated using OLS 
because the results of the specification test indicate that OLS is sufficient for estimation 
against the fixed effects model and the random effects model. Clustered robust standard 
errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. The null hypothesis of the F-test is that the individual fixed effects 
are all zero. The null hypothesis of the Wu–Hausman test is that individual effects are 
not correlated with explanatory variables. The null hypothesis of the Wald test is that the 
coefficient of EGY is equal to one, the coefficients of indicator variables for each year 
are equal to zero, and the constant term is equal to zero. 
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Table 3. The REH test allowing for heterogeneous macroeconomic shocks and measurement errors 
Dependent variable  GY(1) 
 
GY(2) 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
EGY 1.17*** 
  
0.88*** 
 
 
(0.12) 
  
(0.14) 
 
EGY without top and bottom categories 
 
0.90*** 
  
0.52** 
  
(0.20) 
  
(0.23) 
Dummy variable for top category of EGY 
 
0.09** 
  
0.07** 
  
(0.03) 
  
(0.04) 
Dummy variable for bottom category of EGY 
 
–0.17*** 
  
–0.14*** 
  
(0.02) 
  
(0.03) 
Year dummies × Age dummies Yes Yes  
Yes Yes 
Year dummies × Education level dummies Yes Yes  
Yes Yes 
Year dummies × 1st lag of family income Yes Yes  
Yes Yes 
Constant Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
F-test statistics 2.10  2.10  
 
2.64  2.65  
Wu–Hausman test statistics 2591.37  2354.40  
 
942.64  945.40  
Wald test statistics 69.75  71.72  
 
24.69  25.11  
Note: The numbers of observations (households) in models (1) and (2) are 7,128 (2,857) 
and those in models (3) and (4) are 2,859 (1,934). All models are estimated using OLS 
because the results of the specification test indicate that OLS is sufficient for estimation 
against the fixed effects model and the random effects model. Clustered robust standard 
errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. The null hypothesis of the F-test is that the individual fixed effects 
are all zero. The null hypothesis of the Wu–Hausman test is that individual effects are 
not correlated with explanatory variables. The null hypothesis of the Wald test is that the 
coefficient of EGY is equal to one, the coefficients of indicator variables for each year 
are equal to zero, and the constant term is equal to zero. 
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Table 4. The REH test by proxies for forward-looking behavior 
 
(A) Always plan 
 
(B) Retirement plan 
  Yes No   Yes No 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
EGY without top and bottom categories 1.01*** 0.62* 
 
0.87*** 0.91*** 
 
(0.24) (0.35) 
 
(0.29) (0.27) 
Dummy variable for top category of EGY 0.11*** –0.01  
 
0.10*** 0.06  
 
(0.04) (0.07) 
 
(0.04) (0.06) 
Dummy variable for bottom category of EGY –0.17*** –0.17*** 
 
–0.20*** –0.15*** 
 
(0.02) (0.04) 
 
(0.03) (0.03) 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Year dummies × Age dummies Yes Yes  
Yes Yes 
Year dummies × Education level dummies Yes Yes  
Yes Yes 
Year dummies × 1st lag of family income Yes Yes  
Yes Yes 
Constant Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Number of observations 5089  2039  
 
3121  4007  
Number of households (clusters) 2036  821  
 
1240  1617  
Proportion of observations 29% 71%   56% 44% 
Note: All models are estimated using OLS because the results of the specification test 
indicate that OLS is sufficient for estimation against the fixed effects model and the 
random effects model. Clustered robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and 
* indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The null hypothesis 
of the F-test is that the individual fixed effects are all zero. The null hypothesis of the 
Wu-Hausman test is that individual effects are not correlated with explanatory variables. 
The null hypothesis of the Wald test is that the coefficient of EGY is equal to one, the 
coefficients of indicator variables for each year are equal to zero, and the coefficient of 
the constant term is equal to zero.
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Table 5. The excess sensitivity test 
 
Whole sample 
 
Liquidity-unconstrained 
households 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
EGY 0.36** 0.38**     0.37** 0.39**   
 
(0.16) (0.16) 
  
(0.17) (0.17) 
 
EGY_up 
  
0.63** 
   
0.54  
   
(0.32) 
   
(0.33) 
EGY_down 
  
0.25  
   
0.32  
   
(0.23) 
   
(0.24) 
ERROR×YD2005  
–0.59  –0.58  
  
–0.43  –0.43  
  
(0.45) (0.45) 
  
(0.46) (0.46) 
ERROR×YD2006  
–0.49  –0.49  
  
–0.56  –0.55  
  
(0.42) (0.42) 
  
(0.43) (0.43) 
ERROR×YD2007  
0.48  0.48  
  
0.66  0.67  
  
(0.42) (0.42) 
  
(0.44) (0.44) 
ERROR×YD2008  
0.70** 0.70** 
  
0.57  0.57  
  
(0.35) (0.35) 
  
(0.37) (0.37) 
ERROR×YD2009  
0.23  0.24  
  
0.36  0.36  
  
(0.31) (0.31) 
  
(0.32) (0.32) 
ERROR×YD2010  
0.45** 0.46** 
  
0.36  0.36  
  
(0.23) (0.23) 
  
(0.24) (0.24) 
∆FAMILY 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06***  
0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
∆WORKER 0.00  0.00  0.00   
0.00  0.00  0.00  
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
VAR –0.03  –0.04  –0.04  
 
–0.01  –0.01  –0.02  
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)   (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
F-test statistics 0.61 0.61 0.61  
 
0.62  0.62  0.62  
Wu-Hausman test statistics 3.04 6.84 7.15    2.69  6.04  6.72  
Note: The numbers of observations (households) in models (1) and (2) are 7,128 (2,857) 
and those in models (3) and (4) are 6,609 (2,690). The dependent variable is GC. All 
models are estimated using OLS because the results of the specification test indicate 
that OLS is sufficient for estimation against the fixed effects model and the random 
effects model. Clustered robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The null hypothesis of 
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the F-test is that the individual fixed effects are all zero. The null hypothesis of the 
Hausman test is that individual effects are not correlated with explanatory variables. 
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Table 6. Excess sensitivity test according to proxies for forward-looking behavior 
 
(A) Always plan 
 
(B) Retirement plan 
  Yes No   Yes No 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
EGY 
Panel A. Whole sample (Obs.: 7,128) 
0.37* 0.44* 
 
0.33  0.45* 
 
(0.20) (0.25) 
 
(0.23) (0.23) 
Observations 5089  2039  
 
3121  4007  
Proportion of observations 71% 29% 
 
44% 56% 
EGY 
Panel B. Liquidity unconstrained (Obs.: 6,609) 
0.35  0.53** 
 
0.34  0.46* 
 
(0.22) (0.27) 
 
(0.24) (0.25) 
Observations 4734  1875  
 
2952  3657  
Proportion of observations 72% 28%   45% 55% 
Note: All estimates also include interaction of ERROR with year dummies, ∆FAMILY, 
∆WORKER, VAR, age dummies, year dummies, and constant term. All models are 
estimated using OLS because the results of the specification test indicate that OLS is 
sufficient for estimation against the fixed effects model and the random effects model. 
Clustered robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 7. Excess sensitivity test by proxies for self-control problems 
 
(I) Cannot bear not 
buying  
(II) End up 
procrastinating  (III) Cannot execute plan 
 
No Yes   No Yes   No Yes 
Not 
plan 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) (7) 
 Panel A. Whole sample (Obs.: 7,128)    
EGY 0.26  0.67* 
 
0.17  0.81*** 
 
–0.05  0.67*** –0.09  
 
(0.18) (0.37) 
 
(0.19) (0.29) 
 
(0.28) (0.21) (0.66) 
Observations 5654  1474  
 
4829  2299  
 
2476  4130  522  
Proportion of obs. 79% 21% 
 
68% 32% 
 
35% 58% 7% 
 Panel B. Liquidity unconstrained (Obs.: 6,609)    
EGY 0.26  0.73* 
 
0.18  0.85*** 
 
–0.10  0.69*** 0.13  
 
(0.19) (0.39) 
 
(0.21) (0.31) 
 
(0.29) (0.22) (0.68) 
Observations 5253  1356  
 
4519  2090  
 
2302  3824  483  
Proportion of obs. 79% 21%   68% 32%   35% 58% 7% 
Note: All estimates are OLS for the results of the specification test. All estimates also 
include interaction of ERROR with year dummies, ∆FAMILY, ∆WORKER, VAR, age 
dummies, year dummies, and constant term. Clustered robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. 
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Table 8. Excess sensitivity test by proxies for forward-looking behavior and self-control 
problems (excluding liquidity-constrained households) 
 
(A) Always plan 
 
(B) Retirement plan 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
No 
(I) Cannot bear not buying 
 No 0.18  
 
0.50  
 
0.19  
 
0.38  
 
(0.24) 
 
(0.31) 
 
(0.25) 
 
(0.28) 
 
[3812, 58%] 
 
[1441, 22%] 
 
[2462, 37%] 
 
[2791, 42%] 
 Yes 0.78  
 
0.53  
 
0.81  
 
0.65  
 
(0.49) 
 
(0.61) 
 
(0.65) 
 
(0.50) 
 
[922, 14%] 
 
[434, 7%] 
 
[490, 7%] 
 
[866, 13%] 
(II) End up procrastinating 
 No 0.23  
 
0.06  
 
–0.01  
 
0.50* 
 
(0.25) 
 
(0.35) 
 
(0.28) 
 
(0.30) 
 
[3497, 53%] 
 
[1022, 15%] 
 
[2130, 32%] 
 
[2389, 36%] 
 Yes 0.60  
 
1.18*** 
 
1.27*** 
 
0.55  
 
(0.43) 
 
(0.40) 
 
(0.45) 
 
(0.45) 
 
[1237, 19%] 
 
[853, 13%] 
 
[822, 12%] 
 
[1268, 19%] 
(III) Cannot execute plan 
 No –0.28  
 
0.27  
 
–0.45  
 
0.31  
 
(0.34) 
 
(0.54) 
 
(0.39) 
 
(0.43) 
 
[1793, 29%] 
 
[509, 8%] 
 
[1116, 18%] 
 
[1186, 19%] 
 Yes 0.87*** 
 
0.42  
 
1.02*** 
 
0.39  
 
(0.29) 
 
(0.32) 
 
(0.32) 
 
(0.32) 
  [2607, 23%]   [1217, 20%]   [1620, 26%]   [2204, 36%] 
Note: All estimates also include interaction of ERROR with year dummies, ∆FAMILY, 
∆WORKER, VAR, age dummies, year dummies, and constant term. All estimates are 
OLS for the results of the specification test. Clustered robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. The numbers of observations and the proportions of observations are in 
brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
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Table 9. Sophisticated vs. naïve households (excluding liquidity-constrained households) 
 
Whole sample 
 
(I) Cannot bear not buying 
 
(II) End up procrastinating 
 
(III) Cannot execute plan 
      No Yes   No Yes   No Yes Not plan 
 
(1) 
 
(2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) 
 
(6) (7) (8) 
 Panel A. Not have cash          
Naïve (Obs.: 1,714) 
 EGY 0.83*** 
 
0.60* 1.09  
 
0.55  1.46** 
 
0.14  1.20*** 5.24* 
 
(0.32) 
 
(0.33) (0.84) 
 
(0.36) (0.63) 
 
(0.55) (0.39) (2.80) 
 Proportion of obs. 100% 
 
79% 21% 
 
69% 31% 
 
36% 60% 5% 
Sophisticated (Obs.: 4,895) 
 EGY 0.23  
 
0.14  0.52  
 
0.05  0.65* 
 
–0.19  0.53** –0.25  
 
(0.20) 
 
(0.23) (0.44) 
 
(0.25) (0.36) 
 
(0.34) (0.27) (0.71) 
 Proportion of obs. 100% 
 
80% 20% 
 
68% 32% 
 
35% 57% 8% 
Naïve (Obs.: 4,127) 
Panel B. Not use incentives to finish assignments  
 EGY 0.54** 
 
0.39  0.84* 
 
0.40  0.85** 
 
0.12  0.77*** 0.14  
 
(0.21) 
 
(0.24) (0.46) 
 
(0.26) (0.38) 
 
(0.37) (0.28) (0.71) 
 Proportion of obs. 100% 
 
78% 22% 
 
66% 34% 
 
29% 60% 11% 
Sophisticated (Obs.: 2,482) 
 EGY 0.09  
 
0.04  0.22  
 
–0.23  0.84  
 
–0.35  0.42  - 
 
(0.29) 
 
(0.31) (0.77) 
 
(0.34) (0.55) 
 
(0.44) (0.38) - 
 Proportion of obs. 100%   82% 18%   72% 28%   44% 55% 1% 
Note: All estimates also include interaction of ERROR with year dummies, ∆FAMILY, ∆WORKER, VAR, age dummies, year dummies, 
and constant term. All estimates are OLS for the results of the specification test. Clustered robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, 
**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Results are omitted for the sophisticated group for (III) in 
Panel B because the sample size was not large enough to obtain robust estimates. 
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Table A. Distribution of observations by year 
  04–05 05–06 06–07 07–08 08–09 09–10 Total Total obs. 
Our sample 10% 10% 15% 16% 16% 33% 100% 7,128 
Total sample 16% 12% 16% 14% 13% 28% 100% 19,052 
Note: Total sample indicates the number of households that responded in at least two 
consecutive periods. 
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Table B. Excess sensitivity test by forward-looking behavior and self-control problems 
(whole sample) 
 
(A) Always plan 
 
(B) Retirement plan 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
No 
(I) Cannot bear not buying 
 No 0.23  
 
0.40  
 
0.18  
 
0.38  
 
(0.22) 
 
(0.29) 
 
(0.24) 
 
(0.27) 
 
[4103, 58%] 
 
[1551, 22%] 
 
[2593, 36%] 
 
[3061, 43%] 
 Yes 0.69  
 
0.59  
 
0.73  
 
0.63  
 
(0.47) 
 
(0.55) 
 
(0.61) 
 
(0.46) 
 
[986, 14%] 
 
[488, 7%] 
 
[528, 7%] 
 
[946, 13%] 
(II) End up procrastinating 
 No 0.23  
 
0.05  
 
–0.03  
 
0.47* 
 
(0.23) 
 
(0.33) 
 
(0.27) 
 
(0.28) 
 
[3749, 53%] 
 
[1080, 15%] 
 
[2235, 31%] 
 
[2594, 36%] 
 Yes 0.66  
 
0.93** 
 
1.26*** 
 
0.54  
 
(0.42) 
 
(0.38) 
 
(0.42) 
 
(0.42) 
 
[1340, 19%] 
 
[959, 13%] 
 
[886, 12%] 
 
[1413, 20%] 
(III) Cannot execute plan 
 No –0.22  
 
0.30  
 
–0.31  
 
0.25  
 
(0.33) 
 
(0.52) 
 
(0.36) 
 
(0.43) 
 
[1932, 29%] 
 
[544, 8%] 
 
[1189, 18%] 
 
[1287, 19%] 
 Yes 0.84*** 
 
0.37  
 
0.97*** 
 
0.41  
 
(0.27) 
 
(0.30) 
 
(0.31) 
 
(0.29) 
  [2804, 42%]   [1326, 20%]   [1709, 26%]   [2421, 37%] 
Note: All estimates also include interaction of ERROR with year dummies, ∆FAMILY, 
∆WORKER, VAR, age dummies, year dummies, and constant term. All estimates are 
OLS for the results of the specification test. Clustered robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. The numbers of observations and the proportion of observations are in 
brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
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Table C. Cannot execute plan and Types of incentives 
Types of incentives 
   
1. I did my homework with my friends and  
made it a competition to see who could do a better job. 
–0.002   (0.044) 
 
2. I asked my parents to give me a reward 
for completing my homework. 
0.086   (0.192) 
 
3. I put a homework schedule in a place where I would see it. 0.113   (0.035) *** 
4. I tried to sit at my desk at the same time each day. 0.190   (0.034) *** 
5. I used other creative methods for completing my 
homework. 
–0.034   (0.071) 
 
6. I did not follow any specific regimen. Reference 
 
Female dummy 0.008   (0.028) 
 
Age dummies Yes 
 
Observations 1275     
Log likelihood  –796     
Note: Dependent variable is Cannot execute plan, which takes a value of one if the 
response is “Yes” and zero if “No”. The coefficients are marginal effects estimated by 
the probit model. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates significance 
at the 1% level. 
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Table D. Sophisticated vs. naïve households (whole sample) 
 
Whole sample 
 
(I) Cannot bear not buying 
 
(I) End up procrastinating 
 
(III) Cannot execute plan 
      No Yes   No Yes   No Yes Not plan 
 Panel A. Not have cash           
Naïve (Obs.: 1,849) 
EGY 0.96*** 
 
0.80** 0.89  
 
0.65* 1.59** 
 
0.56  1.13*** 3.89  
 
(0.32) 
 
(0.34) (0.83) 
 
(0.35) (0.65) 
 
(0.60) (0.36) (2.71) 
Proportion of obs. 100% 
 
79% 21% 
 
69% 31% 
 
36% 60% 5% 
Sophisticated (Obs.: 5,279) 
EGY 0.18  
 
0.08  0.49  
 
0.02  0.56* 
 
–0.25  0.50** –0.25  
 
(0.19) 
 
(0.22) (0.40) 
 
(0.23) (0.32) 
 
(0.32) (0.25) (0.68) 
Proportion of obs. 100% 
 
79% 21% 
 
67% 33% 
 
34% 57% 8% 
Naïve (Obs.: 4,454) 
Panel B. Not use incentives to finish assignments 
EGY 0.52** 
 
0.39* 0.81* 
 
0.33  0.89** 
 
0.24  0.71*** –0.16  
 
(0.20) 
 
(0.24) (0.43) 
 
(0.25) (0.36) 
 
(0.38) (0.26) (0.69) 
Proportion of obs. 100% 
 
77% 23% 
 
65% 35% 
 
29% 60% 11% 
Sophisticated (Obs.: 2,674) 
EGY 0.11  
 
0.07  0.21  
 
–0.11  0.55  
 
–0.41  0.49  16.59*** 
 
(0.27) 
 
(0.29) (0.69) 
 
(0.32) (0.51) 
 
(0.42) (0.35) (1.63) 
Proportion of obs. 100%   82% 18%   72% 28%   44% 55% 1% 
Note: All estimates also include interaction of ERROR with year dummies, ∆FAMILY, ∆WORKER, VAR, age dummies, year dummies, 
and constant term. All estimates are OLS for the results of the specification test. Clustered robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, 
**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Figure 1. Distribution of expectation of income growth rate (EGY) 
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Figure 2. Means of GY(1), GY(2), and EGY 
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Figure 3. Forecast error of family income change 
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Figure 4. Distribution of proxy for forward-looking (Always plan) 
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Figure 5. Distribution of proxy for forward-looking (Retirement plan) 
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Figure 6. Distribution of proxy for self-control problems (Cannot bear not buying) 
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Figure 7. Distribution of proxy for self-control problems (End up procrastinating) 
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Figure 8. Distribution of proxy for self-control problems (Assignment plans and their 
execution) 
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Figure 9. Distribution of using commitment devices (Use of incentives to finish 
homework) 
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Figure A-1. Distribution of income growth rate (GY(1)) 
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Figure A-2. Distribution of income growth rate (GY(2)) 
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Figure B. Distribution of consumption growth rate (GC) 
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Figure C-1. Distribution of total consumption growth rate (GTC) 
0
.1
.2
.3
Fr
ac
tio
n
-.12 -.1 -.08 -.06 -.04 -.02 0 .02 .04 .06 .08 .1
 
 
 
 60 
 
Figure C-2. Distribution of expectation of consumption growth rate (EGTC) 
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